The Effect of Bank Size and Bank Capital on the Bank Lending Channel for Turkish Banks by Meral, Gökhan
  
 
 
 American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology,  and Sciences  (ASRJETS) 
ISSN (Print) 2313-4410, ISSN (Online) 2313-4402 
© Global Society of Scientific Research and Researchers  
http://asrjetsjournal.org/  
 
The Effect of Bank Size and Bank Capital on the Bank 
Lending Channel for Turkish Banks 
Gökhan Meral* 
Koç University, Ilıca Mah. Sarisin Sk. No:2/9 Narlidere, Izmir 35320, Turkey 
Email: gokmeral@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the existence of a bank lending channel in Turkey over the estimation period 2002Q4-
2008Q4. Consistent with the bank lending channel, I search for evidence that small, undercapitalized banks are 
more sensitive to changes in monetary policy than large, well-capitalized banks. Results suggest that small, 
undercapitalized banks find it harder to raise time deposits than large, well-capitalized banks which support the 
existence of a bank lending channel however the insignificant relationship between the change in the monetary 
policy indicator (Central Bank overnight rates) and the growth rate of bank loans does not support the existence 
of a bank lending channel. 
Keywords: Monetary Transmission Mechanism; Credit Channel, Bank Lending Channel; Capital Leverage 
Ratio; Contractionary Monetary Policy 
1. Introduction 
A major concern in macroeconomics has been the determination of real economic activity, including its 
dimensions like output, employment, income, and spending. To be able to understand the movements in real 
economy and its dimensions, monetary policy makers must accurately assess the timing and effect of their 
policies on the economy. In order to make this assessment, policymakers should understand the monetary 
transmission mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the economy. Economic research goes in two 
directions in the literature studying monetary transmission mechanisms. The first direction followed is the 
money view (or the interest rate channel), and the second direction is the credit view (or the credit channel) [1]. 
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This study focuses on the credit view (credit channel) of monetary transmission mechanism, and henceforth 
attention will be focused on this view. First, to accurately define the credit view, one should understand the 
‘money view’ of neoclassical economics and the differences between the two competing views of monetary 
policy in detail. The traditional ‘money view’ of the monetary transmission mechanism is based on the so-called 
money or interest rate channel, stemming from the standard Keynesian IS-LM framework. According to this 
framework, a contractionary monetary policy leading to a rise in real interest rates, which in turn increases the 
cost of capital, causes a decline in investment spending, thereby leads to a decrease in aggregate demand and a 
decrease in output [1]. The interest rate channel operates through the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets. 
When the central bank drains reserves from the banking system, this action lowers the demand deposits (DD) of 
banks and the money supply. The increase in interest rates and the reduction in money supply depress the 
economy, and if bank loans fall it is due only to a reduction in loan demand triggered by the economic 
depression. This is how the money or interest channel works [2].  
The money view sees banks as passive intermediaries for funds between a central bank and borrowers. In 
contrast, the credit channel puts special emphasis on the role of banks in the aggregate economic activity. 
Assuming the existence of bank-dependent borrowers, the credit view states that a change in monetary policy 
(either an increase or a decrease in open-market interest rates) tends to change the external cost of financing in 
the same direction for bank-dependent borrowers. The money channel tries to explain the effect of policy 
through changes in the money supply-which change interest rates and spending in turn-, however if there exist   
i) substantial information-related frictions in financial markets, and ii) there exist borrowers those are primarily 
bank-dependent, then the credit channel provides a more plausible explanation for the transmission of monetary 
policy through banks to the real economy.  
According to the credit view, monetary policy shocks may affect the real economic activity in two ways; first, a 
policy shock can influence the net worth of borrower firms (increasing their liabilities and decreasing their 
assets) and affect their ability to borrow. Monetary policy can affect firms’ financial positions both directly and 
indirectly. Policy may have two direct affects; first it may increase the interest payments on firms’ outstanding 
debt, second it may influence the value of their collateral assets. Indirectly, policy may affect the spending of 
firms’ customers and cause a decline in firm revenue. This mechanism of the credit channel is called the 
borrower net worth channel (BNWC) or the balance - sheet channel.  
The second mechanism through which the credit channel operates is the bank lending channel (BLC). BLC 
works as follows; contractionary policy decreases reserves and the decrease in reserves decreases 
demand/reservable deposits (DD), if some banks can not offset this decline in DD by increasing non-
reservable/large time deposits (TD) or by decreasing securities holdings, then the contractionary policy will 
decrease their loan supply. Decrease in loan supply will affect bank-dependent borrowers and reduce their 
investment and consumption expenditures [3].  
Existence of the BLC require three conditions: (1) existence of bank-dependent, high information cost 
borrowers, (2) existence of at least some banks which can not cover a decrease in demand deposits frictionlessly 
by raising large time deposits or by reducing securities (in other words monetary policy can shift the loan 
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supplies of at least some banks), and (3) prices must be sticky, so that monetary policy can have real effects on 
the economy without being neutralized. The last condition is necessary for both the money and the credit views. 
Depending on banks’ cross-bank characteristic differences (for example asset size or liquidity), their sensitivity 
to monetary policy may be different. This study tries to find evidence on the existence of a bank lending channel 
in Turkey between 2002Q4:2008Q4, dividing banks both by asset size and by capital leverage ratio (equity 
capital/assets). The hypothesis to be tested is; small, undercapitalized banks are more responsive to monetary 
policy than large, well-capitalized banks. The intuition behind this hypothesis can be summarized as follows: 
small, undercapitalized banks find it more difficult to raise time deposits during periods of contractionary policy 
compared to large, well-capitalized banks, hence they may not be able to offset a drain in reserves as easily as 
large, well-capitalized banks can. This argument is supportive for the BLC [2].  
This study contributes to the credit view literature in Turkey in two ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the 
first study that considers both asset sizes and capital leverage ratios of Turkish banks while investigating the 
existence of a bank lending channel in Turkey. Second, results including the effect of bank capital on the 
transmission of monetary policy underline the importance of regulatory policy on banking during economic 
crisis. The following section discusses the BLC literature that motivates my study. 
2. Literature Review 
Bernanke and Blinder [4] developed a simple model of aggregate demand, which is a variant of the textbook 
IS/LM model, aimed to compare the effects of money and credit (bank loans) on real economic activity. They 
find that money-demand shocks became more important relative to credit-demand shocks in the 1980s, and they 
suggest a more symmetric treatment of money and credit. Bernanke and Blinder [5] use aggregate bank data 
from 1959 to 1978 to identify a decline in bank loans after contractionary monetary policy. However, loans 
respond with a significant lag (6-9 months) and interestingly this response roughly corresponds to the response 
of unemployment. They conclude that the co-movement of unemployment and bank loans following a change in 
the funds rate is consistent with the credit view, hence monetary policy works at least in part through the credit 
channel as well as through the interest rate channel.  
There are studies favoring the money view and studies favoring the credit view. Romer, Romer, Goldfeld and 
Friedman [6] find two types of evidence supporting the money view; first, banks are able to raise funds with 
little cost during tightening periods, so the impact of restrictive policy on bank lending will be small. Second; 
because reserve requirements on bank deposits are high, contractionary policy is more likely to operate through 
bank liabilities (deposits) rather than bank assets (bank lending). Bernanke and Gertler [7] do not see the credit 
channel as a distinct alternative to the interest rate channel. Instead they see it as a complementary tool to the 
conventional interest rate effects which help explaining the magnitude, timing and composition of policy effects 
on the economy in a more reasonable way. Using vector auto-regressions (VARs), they try to identify the effects 
of policy on economy by looking at output, demand and spending responses to monetary policy shocks. They 
point out shortcomings of the conventional money view in explaining these responses. Bernanke and Gertler [7] 
also investigate the housing market in the U.S., focusing on the borrowing and spending decisions of 
households, particularly their spending on costly durable items such as houses. They suggest that the high 
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sensitivity of housing investment to monetary policy shocks may be explained in part by the workings of both 
the bank lending and the balance sheet channels. They argue that the bank lending channel may have been in 
effect especially during the Regulation Q period when there were funding constraints for banks because of the 
imposed deposit rate ceilings. Their argument is that the deposit funding constraint for banks may have played a 
role in the decline of housing investment (which accounts for the largest fraction of the decline in economic 
activity) by disrupting the flow of mortgage loans. They also argue that the balance sheet channel may be 
another plausible explanation for the decrease in housing investment such that, consumer balance sheets having 
been deteriorated by increasing down-payment requirements and transactions costs may have caused a decline 
in housing demand and hence a decline in demand for mortgage loans.  
The BLC literature includes studies focusing on different credit aggregates, or on balance sheets of firms. It is 
hard to distinguish between loan supply and loan demand effects looking at the aggregate data. Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox [8] use a mix of bank loans and commercial papers-issued by firms- to provide evidence of a credit 
channel. They argue that if the monetary policy operates solely through the money channel and if the bank loans 
fall after a tightening due only to a decrease in credit demand, then the demand for non-bank sources of credit-
for example, the commercial paper demand- should decline as well. On the other hand, if the monetary policy 
operates through the credit channel, then a tightening reduces the supply of bank credit while it increases 
commercial paper issuance, to the extent that businesses have some ability to substitute between the two sources 
of finance. They find that shifts in monetary policy change the mix of loans and commercial paper where 
commercial paper issuance rises and bank loans fall. In addition, those shifts in loan supply seem to affect 
investment even controlling for interest rates and output. These results support the existence of a bank lending 
channel. Morgan [9] contributes to the literature on the different credit aggregates by comparing commitment 
and non-commitment loans where a loan commitment is defined as a contract which obligates banks to lend to a 
firm up to some limit, for some length of time, at specified terms. He finds that tight policy slows the growth of 
non-commitment loans relative to commitment loans. This finding coincides with reports of tighter credit by 
lenders and by smaller firms suggesting the divergence between commitment and non-commitment loans may 
reflect either a lending channel or a balance sheet channel of policy.  
Disentangling declines in bank loans resulting from reduced loan demand from declines resulting from reduced 
loan supply has been the major concern in the BLC literature. Using micro-bank level-data is an attempt to 
overcome this problem in aggregate data. There are papers including Kashyap and Stein [10] that look for 
balance sheet effects by comparing the impact of monetary policy on the loan supply of small and large banks. 
Kashyap and Stein [10] separate banks by both asset size and liquidity (securities to asset ratio). Using quarterly 
data of U.S. commercial banks from 1976 to 1993; they find that small, less liquid banks are most responsive to 
monetary policy. Although they find evidence of a lending channel, the results do not allow them to make 
precise statements about the quantitative importance of the BLC in real economy.  
The “credit crunch” studies in the monetary transmission mechanism literature focuses on the effect of bank 
capital on loan and output growth. Peek and Rosengren [11] find that poorly capitalized banks contracted more 
during New England banks’ credit crunch. Peek and Rosengren [12] provide evidence that undercapitalized 
banks are more engaged with derivatives activity and eager to take speculative positions which makes them 
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more vulnerable to a monetary policy shock. Berger and Udell [13] examine how risk-based capital (RBC) 
regulations affected the reallocation of U.S. commercial bank credit from loans to securities. Motivated by the 
above credit crunch literature, Kishan and Opiela [2] choose bank capital among the alternative bank balance 
sheet characteristics-that affect bank loan supplies- as a constraint on banks’ ability to fund loans. They separate 
banks according to asset size and capital leverage ratio and provide evidence that the loan growth of small, 
undercapitalized banks; small, adequately capitalized banks and small, well-capitalized banks is significantly 
affected by monetary policy. They contribute to the literature in three ways; first, they suggest that policy has 
distributional effects on loan supplies of banks with different asset sizes and capital leverage ratios. Second, 
they find that the growth in large time deposits for small undercapitalized banks is unresponsive to policy which 
they use as evidence favoring the BLC against bank net worth channel (BNWC). In their more recent paper, 
Kishan and Opiela [14] investigate loan responses of low and high capital banks in expansionary and 
contractionary periods separately. They find that contractionary policy decreases the loans of small low-capital 
banks, and expansionary policy is not able to increase the loan growth of the low-capital banks relative to the 
high capital banks.  
Erdoğan, Beşballı [15], Çavuşoğlu [3] and Işık [16] are some of the studies searching for evidence of a bank 
lending channel in Turkey. Çavuşoğlu [3] uses dynamic panel data modeling with Generalized Method of 
Moments estimations to empirically test the existence of a bank lending channel in Turkey. He does not find 
evidence of a bank lending channel in Turkey over the period 1988-1999, this outcome is reflected in the lack of 
a significant relationship between the change in the monetary policy indicator and the growth rate of the loan 
supply in the estimated models. Separating banks by asset size does not improve his results. Erdoğan, Beşballı 
[15] use VAR methodology to empirically analyze the BLC between 1996 and 2006, according to their findings 
the credit channel operates partially in Turkey. Işık [16] investigates the bank loan supply behavior of Turkish 
banks over the 1998Q1-2007Q3 period. She divides banks by both asset size and liquidity ratio and finds that 
small banks with less liquid balance sheets are more sensitive to monetary policy shock and takes this as 
evidence of a broad credit channel. I follow the above literature and use bank-level data in order to identify loan 
supply movements of banks distinguished by their asset-size and capital leverage ratio. I expect that there is 
evidence of a bank lending channel in the case that following a monetary tightening, the loan supply of small 
and/or less capitalized banks shrinks more than the loan supply of large and/or well-capitalized banks. However, 
in Turkey it is hard for banks in general to find external sources of funding that is why it may not be surprising 
if the loan supply movements of small banks do not differ significantly from the loan supply movements of 
large banks. This fact suggests that the results of this study will be conservative.  
This study is mainly motivated by Kishan and Opiela [2] paper, and it expands the methodology used by them 
with panel pooled OLS fixed effects models. First, I divide banks by both asset size and leverage ratio and form 
four groups. Second, I divide banks by asset size and leverage ratio separately forming two groups for each 
criteria. Finally, I (1) consider a regression for the pooled sample adding dummies for capital and asset size. (2) 
I then consider a panel regression to control for bank-specific effects on the supply of bank loans. I look for 
evidence of a credit channel in general, and a bank lending channel in particular. To my knowledge, this study is 
the first to investigate the existence of a BLC in Turkey that distinguishes banks by both asset size and capital 
leverage ratio. Before moving on to the details of the methodology used, next section provides general 
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information about the Turkish banking sector over the estimation period 2002-2008.  
3. Turkish Banking Sector 2002-2008 
Turkish economy experienced a stable and high growth performance between 2002 and 2008, except for a rapid 
deceleration in the last quarter of 2008. Gross domestic product (GDP) followed an increasing trend in general. 
Total consumption expenditure followed a similar pattern with GDP. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show quarterly 
values of these two macro indicators and Figure 3 shows annual change in investment and consumption over the 
period 2002Q4-2008Q4. 
 
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product (2002-2008) 
 
    Figure 2: Consumption Expenditure (2002-2008). Data Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
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Figure 3: Annual change in Consumption and Investment (in constant price) 
 
As banks are the major source of funding and investment, economy’s expansionary pattern between 2002 and 
2008 brought about an increase in both the bank loans to GDP and the bank deposits to GDP ratios. Figure 4 
presents these two ratios annually. 
 
 
Figure 4: Annual Loans/GDP and Deposits/GDP ratios. Source: "Banks in Turkey 2008", The Banking 
Association of Turkey 
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Total number of banks in Turkey was 45 as the end of December, 2008. Out of 45 banks, 32 were deposit banks, 
and 13 were development and investment banks. There was also one bank owned by Saving Deposits and 
Insurance Fund (SDIF).  
When the balance sheet components of banks are analyzed, we see an upward trend in total deposits, securities 
and loans. Figure 5 shows quarterly movements in total deposits and securities over the period 2002Q4-2008Q4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Total Deposits and Securities. Data Source: Turkish Banks Association  
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Figure 6: Bank Loans versus Overnight Rates. Data Source: Turkish Banks Association  
 
Figure 6 shows quarterly movements of bank loans and Central Bank of Turkey’s overnight rates. When we 
analyze the movements of bank loans and overnight rates; during the first five quarters, there is a decline in the 
overnight rates; on the other hand, loans follow an upward trend during the period and in the following five 
quarters. When we look at the third quarter of 2006, we see a jump in the overnight rate, however loans do not 
decline in that contractionary period, in contrast they follow an upward trend. In general, loans follow an 
upward trend through the 25 quarters from 2002Q4 to 2008Q4 and overnight rates follow a downward trend. 
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Table 1: Bank mean balance sheet ratios, 2002:Q4-2008:Q4 
                                                                                                             (I)                                                                                  
(II)             
Bank K/A Ratio Category                                          Small banks(Assets<8 billion €)                      Large 
banks(Assets>8 billion €) 
 
Mean-All banks 
Number of Banks                                                                             25                                                                                    
7 
 
As a Fraction of Total Assets               
1.     Securities                                                                                 0.533                                                                              
0.396                                                  
2.     Total loans                                                                               0.387                                                                              
0.371                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3. Total Deposits                                                                             0.478                                                                              
0.680                                                          
4. Demand Deposits                                                                       0.085                                                                              
0.108                                                                       
5. Large Time Deposits                                                                  0.402                                                                              
0.573                                                                              
6. Capital                                                                                           0.214                                                                              
0.118        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
7. Loan delinquency rate                                                               1.638                                                                              
0.103                                         
8. Correlation coefficient                                                                                                                                                                                                        
      between delinquency rate 
      and capital/asset                                                                       0.714                                                                             
-0.381 
 
Mean-K/A<0.13 
Number of banks                                                                            10                                                                                     
5 
 
As a Fraction of Total Assets               
9.        Securities                                                                              0.412                                                                               
0.369       
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10.      Total loans                                                                            0.481                                                                               
0.362                              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
11. Total Deposits                                                                          0.596                                                                               
0.705                                                            
12. Demand Deposits                                                                    0.099                                                                               
0.106                                                                       
13. Large Time Deposits                                                               0.497                                                                               
0.599                                           
14. Capital                                                                                        0.109                                                                               
0.105        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
15. Loan delinquency rate                                                            0.035                                                                               
0.126                                           
16. Correlation coefficient                                                                                                                                                                                                        
      between delinquency rate 
      and capital/asset                                                                     -0.323                                                                               
0.048                             
 
Mean-K/A>0.13 
Number of banks                                                                             15                                                                                     
2 
 
As a Fraction of Total Assets               
18.        Securities                                                                           0.614                                                                               
0.464       
19.        Total loans                                                                         0.293                                                                               
0.394                              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
20. Total Deposits                                                                          0.400                                                                              
0.618             
21. Demand Deposits                                                                    0.075                                                                              
0.112                                                                                                                                                      
22. Large Time Deposits                                                               0.338                                                                              
0.507                                           
23. Capital                                                                                       0.283                                                                               
0.150        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
24. Loan delinquency rate                                                            2.783                                                                               
0.047                                                
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25. Correlation coefficient                                                                                                                                                                                                        
      between delinquency rate 
      and capital/asset                                                                      0.737                                                                                   
-                                                                           
To analyze the cross-sectional differences in bank lending decisions, banks are divided into two asset-size 
categories and two capital leverage ratio groups. Banks with an asset size larger than 8 billion € are considered 
large banks where the others are considered small banks. Meanwhile banks with an equity capital to assets ratio 
greater than 13% are considered as well-capitalized, the others are considered as undercapitalized. This 
methodology is taken from Kishan and Opiela [2] who divide banks into six asset-size categories and three 
capital leverage ratio groups. This study divides banks into smaller number of categories because the number of 
banks available for analysis is far less than the number of banks used by Kishan and Opiela [2]. 
Table 1 shows the mean value of some basic balance sheet variables for each asset-size category for all banks 
and for the same size categories for banks divided into two leverage ratios. There are several points worth 
emphasizing:  
(1) Securities to assets ratio decreases significantly when we move from the small banks to the large banks in 
both of the leverage ratio groups, (compare ninth row first and second columns and compare eighteenth row first 
and second columns)  
(2) Loans to assets ratio is close for small and large banks in the whole sample, (second row column one and 
two) however for the undercapitalized group, loans/assets ratio decreases, (compare tenth row first and second 
columns) whereas for the well-capitalized group this ratio increases (compare nineteenth row first and second 
columns) while moving from the small banks to the large banks, 
(3) Small banks depend less on deposits funding than large banks (third row first and second columns) and well-
capitalized banks depend less on deposits funding than undercapitalized banks, (compare first column eleventh 
and twentieth rows, compare second column eleventh and twentieth rows)   
(4) Demand deposits (DD) has the least importance in funding loans and DD/assets ratio is quite similar for all 
asset-size and leverage ratio groups, (look at twelfth row first and second columns, and twenty-first row first and 
second columns) and well-capitalized banks are less dependent on time deposits (TD) (compare first column 
thirteenth and twenty-second rows, and compare second column thirteenth and twenty-second rows) (2) is not 
compatible with the bank characteristics of Kishan and Opiela (2000) sample. Regardless of leverage ratio, 
loans to assets rise with bank size in their sample. (3) is not compatible with Kishan and Opiela (2000) bank 
sample, either. Their implication is that larger and better capitalized banks are less dependent to deposits than 
smaller and less-capitalized banks. Kishan and Opiela (2000) bank sample implies that large, well-capitalized 
banks depend less on DD and more on TD however in this sample large, undercapitalized banks depend on TD 
more [implication (4)].  
Having observed the general outlook of the economy, the banking sector and the bank balance sheet 
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characteristics in Turkey over the estimation period 2002Q4-2008Q4, now we are ready to move to the 
methodology section of the study.  
4. Methodology and Data 
This study is mainly motivated by the methodology used by Kishan and Opiela [2]. Consistent with the bank 
lending channel, my hypothesis is that an increase (decline) in overnight rates should decrease (increase) the 
loan supply of banks and this decline should be more pronounced for the small and less-capitalized banks. 
Although an increase in overnight rates is expected to increase time deposits, loans will still fall because the 
increase in time deposits will not be high enough to cover the decrease in demand deposits. The testable 
hypotheses are; ∂LN/∂rON<0 and ∂TD/∂rON>0; where LN, TD and rON stand for loans, time deposits and 
Central Bank of Turkey overnight rates in order. The data is obtained from the Turkish Banking Association and 
from the Central Bank of Turkey. The data set consists of the overnight interest rates, and the bank level 
variables; total loans, demand deposits, large time deposits, securities and capital for 25 quarters over the period 
2002Q4-2008Q4. 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In the first sub-section, the methodology used by Kishan and 
Opiela [2] is introduced and it is estimated with a few modifications. The second sub-section, utilizes panel 
pooled OLS estimation model with the fixed effects estimation technique. 
4.1. Ordinary Least Squares Model 
Banks are separated into four groups by both asset-size and capital leverage ratio, and then they are divided into 
two groups first by asset-size and then by capital leverage ratio separately.  
The variables used in the first step regressions of the methodology include; grLN (growth rate of loans), grLNt−1,..., grLNt−4 (four lagged values of grLN), chratet−1,.., chratet−4 (four lagged values of the change in 
overnight rates), grTD  (current period growth in large time deposits), grSEC  (current period growth in 
securities), plus three seasonal dummy variables (D1, D2, D3). The econometric model is; 
𝑔𝑟𝐿𝑁 = 𝛼_𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽_1 (�𝑔𝑟𝐿𝑁�_(𝑡 − 1) ) + 𝛽_2 (�𝑔𝑟𝐿𝑁�_(𝑡 − 2) ) + 𝛽_3 (�𝑔𝑟𝐿𝑁�_(𝑡 − 3) ) +
𝛽_4 (�𝑔𝑟𝐿𝑁�_(𝑡 − 4) ) + 𝛽_5 (�𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒�_(𝑡 − 1) ) + 𝛽_6 (�𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒�_(𝑡 − 2) ) +
𝛽_7 (�𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒�_(𝑡 − 3) ) + 𝛽_8 (�𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒�_(𝑡 − 4) ) + 𝛽_9 (𝑔𝑟𝑇𝐷) + 𝛽_10 (𝑔𝑟𝑆𝐸𝐶) + 𝛽_11 (𝐷_1 ) +
𝛽_12 (𝐷_2 ) + 𝛽_13 (𝐷_3 ) + 𝜀_𝑖𝑡                                  (1)                                                   
Using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique, the growth rate of loans is regressed on the 
above mentioned variables. First, pooled OLS estimation technique is used to capture the difference in the sum 
of coefficients of the (lagged) change in overnight rate variables for different capital leverage and asset size 
groups. Second, this estimation technique is used to see the change in policy response for only asset size classes. 
Third, the same estimation technique is used to see the change in policy response for only leverage ratio classes. 
αit  captures the bank level fixed effects. Both αit  and εit  are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed. For stationarity, growth rate of the variables are used. Time deposits and securities are included to 
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capture the ‘funding’ effects on loans. For each group of banks, the OLS estimations are run separately and one 
coefficient is reported per group in the results. The main interest is on the sum of the coefficients of  
𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1,.., 𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−4 (𝛽5+𝛽6+𝛽7+𝛽8) and on the coefficient of 𝑔𝑟𝑇𝐷, 𝛽9. Consistent with my hypothesis, a 
negative sign associated with the overnight rate coefficient will imply that an increase in overnight rates will 
cause a decline in loans and a positive sign associated with the 𝑔𝑟𝑇𝐷 coefficient will imply that an increase in 
time deposits will affect loans positively. For small and undercapitalized banks, the sum of the coefficients of 
the lagged values of overnight rates is expected to be negative and the coefficient of the growth in time deposits 
is expected to be positive. For large and well-capitalized banks, sum of the coefficients are expected to be 
positive (less negative) and the coefficient of 𝑔𝑟𝑇𝐷  is expected to be positive and more significant. The 
response of securities to changes in the overnight rates is indeterminate. Banks may choose to sell securities to 
fund loans or time deposits may be used for funding loans and securities may increase to balance asset risk. 
Hence, 𝛽10 may be either negative or positive [2]. 
4.2. Panel Ordinary Least Squares Model 
In this section, I use a panel regression approach with pooled OLS estimation technique and fixed effects 
models. Unlike the previous sub-section, banks are not grouped and all banks are regressed at once. The aim of 
this method is to get more accurate econometric results with the small data set used (which consists of 30 
banks). In order to observe the policy responses of different asset-size and capital leverage ratio classes, slope 
dummies are added to the regressions. By clustering banks, panel robust standard errors are obtained. Three 
different models are used; (i) first-difference model, (ii) log model, and (iii) log difference model. The first 
difference model is; 
𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1 = 𝛽1[(𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−1] + 𝛽2[(𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−2] + 𝛽3[(𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−3] + 𝛽4[(𝐿𝑁𝑡 −
𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−4] + 𝛽5[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−1] + 𝛽6[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−2] + 𝛽7[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−3] + 𝛽8[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−4] + 𝛽9(𝑇𝐷𝑡 −
𝑇𝐷𝑡−1) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝛽11(𝐷1) + 𝛽12(𝐷2) + 𝛽13(𝐷3) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                    (2)                                                                                                    
In the first difference model, change in loans (LNt − LNt−1) is regressed on four lagged values of itself, four 
lagged values of the change in overnight rates (rt − rt−1) , change in TD (TDt − TDt−1) , change in SEC (SECt − SECt−1), plus three seasonal dummy variables. The log model is; 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 = 𝛽1[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡)𝑡−1] + 𝛽2[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡)𝑡−2] + 𝛽3[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡)𝑡−3] + 𝛽4[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡)𝑡−4] + 𝛽5[(𝑟𝑂𝑁)𝑡−1] +
𝛽6[(𝑟𝑂𝑁)𝑡−2] + 𝛽7[(𝑟𝑂𝑁)𝑡−3] + 𝛽8[(𝑟𝑂𝑁)𝑡−4] + 𝛽9(𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐷𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽11(𝐷1) + 𝛽12(𝐷2) + 𝛽13(𝐷3) +
𝛽14(𝐷𝑦1) + 𝛽15(𝐷𝑦2) + 𝛽16(𝐷𝑦3) + 𝛽17(𝐷𝑦4) + 𝛽18(𝐷𝑦5) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                          (3)                                                                                                       
In the log model, log of loans (ln LNt) is regressed on four lagged values of itself, four lagged values of the 
overnight rates (rON), log of TD (ln TDt), log of SEC (ln SECt), three seasonal dummies and also on five yearly 
dummies for the 6 year estimation period. 
The final model is the log difference model; 
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𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1 =
𝛽1[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−1] + 𝛽2[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−2] + 𝛽3[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−3] + 𝛽4[(𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡 −
𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑁𝑡−1)𝑡−4] + 𝛽5[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−1] + 𝛽6[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−2] + 𝛽7[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−3] + 𝛽8[(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑡−4] +
𝛽9(𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐷𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐷𝑡−1) + 𝛽10(𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝛽11(𝐷1) + 𝛽12(𝐷2) + 𝛽13(𝐷3) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (4)    
In the log difference model, log change in loans (ln LNt − ln LNt−1) is regressed on four lagged values of itself, 
four lagged values of the change in overnight rates (rt − rt−1), log change in TD (ln TDt − ln TDt−1), log 
change in SEC (ln SECt − ln SECt−1) and three seasonal dummy variables.  
Sum of the coefficients of lagged values of overnight rates (𝛽5+𝛽6+𝛽7+𝛽8) is expected to be negative and the 
coefficient of time deposits (𝛽9) is expected to be positive in all three models. When banks are divided into asset 
size and capital leverage ratio categories, the overnight rate coefficient associated with the small bank group is 
expected to be negative and greater in absolute value than the large bank group. Similarly, the overnight rate 
coefficient associated with the undercapitalized bank group is expected to be negative and greater in absolute 
value than the well-capitalized bank group. In addition, the time deposits coefficient is expected to be less 
positive for the small and the undercapitalized bank groups which will reflect the severity of funding loans by 
raising time deposits for small and undercapitalized banks. If these coefficients end up being significant with the 
predicted signs, then results will provide evidence of a bank lending channel.  
There are some important points to mention about these models. First, the first-difference and the log-difference 
models drop the bank-specific effects variable (αit). This helps to relieve the strong assumption in the previous 
sub-section that αit is i.i.d. Second, by estimating the system as a panel dataset, all models will assume that the 
error term may change between different banks. Stationarity is still assumed as a time series property of the 
data. Finally, in the log model yearly dummies are added to control for the annual economic fluctuations. There 
are two effects of this modification; it increases the R-squared values in estimation results significantly, 
however it decreases the degrees of freedom. In the difference models-both first difference and log difference- 
the yearly dummies drop out in the same way the bank-level fixed effects do.                   
5. Emprical Results 
This section is divided into two parts. The first sub-section shows the results of the OLS estimation for four 
groups of banks (divided by both asset-size and leverage ratio), and 2 groups of banks divided by asset-size and 
2 groups of banks divided by leverage ratio. The second sub-section presents the results for panel pooled OLS 
(fixed effects) estimation for the first-difference, the log, and the log difference models. 
Table 2 below shows the number of banks grouped by both asset size and capital leverage ratio. Number of 
banks in each group of the 4-group regression is as follows; 10 banks in the small, undercapitalized category; 5 
banks in the large, undercapitalized category; 13 banks in the small, well-capitalized category and 2 banks in the 
large, well-capitalized category. Number of banks in each group of the 2-group asset-size based regression is as 
follows; 23 banks in the small category and 7 banks in the large category. Number of banks in each group of the 
2-group leverage ratio based regression is as follows; 15 banks in the undercapitalized category and 15 banks in 
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the well-capitalized category.  
Table 2: Number of banks in each group 
 
Bank K/A Ratio Category                         All banks                                Small banks                             Large 
banks 
                                                                                                                    (Assets<8 billion €)               (Assets>8 
billion €)                               
 
All banks                                                                                                              23                                                       
7 
Undercapitalized banks                                  15                                                10                                                       
5 
(K/A<0.13) 
Well-capitalized banks                                    15                                                13                                                       
2    
(K/A>0.13) 
 
 
Table 3: The effect of the change in overnight rates on the growth rate of loans1 
4 GROUPS 
                                                           Banks with Capital/Asset Ratio<0.13 
                                                                                   Bank Size                                                                                                                                           
Variable                                                Small Banks                                              Large Banks 
∑ Change in ON rates41                              -0,0101      -0,0728 
                                                                   (0.955)                                                      (0.482)                                                  
Change in Securities                                  0.0560                                                      -0.0354    
                                                                   (0.210)                                                      (0.518)     
Change in Time Deposits                          -0.0016                                                      0.6864 
                                                                   (0.000)***                                                (0.000)*** 
R2                                                                 0.3521                                                       0.6279 
No of observations:                                    200                                                             100   
                                                            Banks with Capital/Asset Ratio>0.13 
                                                                                   Bank Size 
Variable                                                Small Banks                                              Large Banks 
∑ Change in ON rates41                              2,6792                                                      -0,2379 
                                                                  (0.389)                                                       (0.066)* 
Change in Securities                                -0.0437                                                        0.2003  
                                                                  (0.804)                                                       (0.177) 
Change in Time Deposits                          0.0347                                                        0.4898 
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                                                                  (0.056)*                                                     (0.003)** 
R2                                                                0.0581                                                       0.7498     
No of observations:                                    260                                                              40 
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
1 Each specification also includes four lagged values of the dependent variable and three seasonal dummy 
variables. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level.*** = Significant at 1 percent 
level. 
5.1. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the effect of policy on loans. The sums of the coefficients associated with 
changes in the overnight rates are negative for small, undercapitalized; large, undercapitalized and large, well-
capitalized banks. However the overnight rate coefficients reported for undercapitalized banks are insignificant 
and smaller in absolute value than those of the large, well-capitalized banks. The sum of the coefficients of the 
change in overnight rates is negative and significant at 10 percent level for the large, well-capitalized banks 
group. The overnight rate coefficient of the small, well-capitalized group is positive and large, but it is not 
significant. The coefficient associated with the overnight rates for small, undercapitalized bank category was 
expected to be negative, significant and greater in absolute value than the overnight rate coefficient associated 
with large and well-capitalized banks. The overnight rate coefficient of the small, undercapitalized bank group is 
negative but not significant. Consequently, the overnight rate coefficient values in Table 3 do not provide 
evidence consistent with our hypothesis that small, undercapitalized banks are most responsive to a monetary 
policy shock.  
The coefficients of the change in securities are insignificant for all bank groups. However, the coefficients of the 
change in time deposits are significant and positive for all groups except the small, undercapitalized group. This 
result may provide evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel in the sense that the small or 
undercapitalized banks may find it difficult to raise time deposits during contractionary periods, compared to the 
large or well-capitalized banks. But this alone is not enough to provide evidence for a lending channel, since the 
effect of this severity of financing for small, undercapitalized banks is not reflected on the sum of the 
coefficients associated with changes in the overnight rates. Dividing banks separately first by asset-size and then 
by capital leverage ratio may be helpful in order to distinguish the effects of asset-size and capital leverage ratio 
on the sensitivity of bank loans to changes in the overnight rates.  
Table 4: The effect of the change in overnight rates on the growth rate of loans2 
2 GROUPS (Asset-based) 
Bank Size 
Variable                                                     Small banks(<8 billion €)                     Large banks(>8 billion €)                                            
∑ Change in ON rates41                                          1.4902                                                 -0.1009 
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                                                                              (0.404)                                                   (0.215)                            
Change in Securities                                            -0.0452                                                  -0.0233  
                                                                              (0.777)                                                   (0.646) 
Change in Time Deposits                                     -0.0008                                                   0.6851 
                                                                              (0.462)                                                   (0.000)*** 
R2                                                                            0.0351                                                   0.6315 
No of observations                                                460                                                        140 
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
2Each specification also includes four lagged values of the dependent variable and three seasonal dummy 
variables. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 percent 
level.       
 
Table 5: The effect of the change in overnight rates on the growth rate of loans2 
2 GROUPS(Capital-based) 
Capital/Asset Ratio 
Variable                                                           K/A<0.13                                              0.13<K/A                        
∑ Change in ON rates41                                        0.0396                                                 2,2819 
                                                                            (0.754)                                                 (0.398)                            
Change in Securities                                           0.0650                                                -0.0408  
                                                                            (0.168)                                                 (0.818) 
Change in Time Deposits                                   -0.0015                                                 0.0351 
                                                                            (0.000)***                                          (0.052)* 
R2                                                                          0.2853                                                  0.0511 
No of observations                                               300                                                       300 
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
2Each specification also includes four lagged values of the dependent variable and three seasonal dummy 
variables. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 percent 
level.       
Table 4 and Table 5 show the effects of policy on total loan growth depending on banks’ asset-size and capital 
to assets ratio, in turn. In Table 4, the sum of coefficients of the change in overnight rates are both insignificant 
and the estimate is positive and large for small banks, whereas it is negative and small for large banks. The signs 
are opposite to what our hypothesis predicts however the coefficient values are insignificant. When we analyze 
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the movements of time deposits for small and large banks, the coefficient of the change in time deposits is 
negative for small banks and positive (and significant) for large banks. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that larger banks may find it easier to raise time deposits during contractionary periods. Change in 
securities estimates are both negative but insignificant. Hence, it is hard to state that both large and small banks 
find it difficult to raise securities in times of recession leaning on the change in securities estimates of Table 4.  
In Table 5, sum of the change in overnight rates coefficients are positive and insignificant for both 
undercapitalized and well-capitalized groups. Coefficients of the change in securities are insignificant and not 
much different in both capital groups. Table 5 provides evidence on the severity of financing for 
undercapitalized banks. The coefficient of the change in time deposits is (unexpectedly) negative and significant 
(at 1 percent level) for undercapitalized banks, whereas it is positive and significant (at 10 percent level) for 
well-capitalized banks. The negative coefficient associated with the change in time deposits for undercapitalized 
banks suggests that an increase in time deposits decreases bank loan supply which is not consistent with the 
bank lending channel. This coefficient was expected to be positive for both capital groups and less positive for 
the undercapitalized group. Negative sign of this coefficient may be due to the small data set available. Table 3 
and Table 4 provide evidence that it is harder for small banks to raise time deposits than large banks during 
contractionary periods. This is consistent with the bank lending channel. Although there is evidence in favor of 
the bank lending channel (behavior of large time deposits), this evidence is not supported by the behavior of 
overnight interest rates. Evidence of a bank lending channel in Turkey is not overwhelming.    
 
Table 6: The effect of the change in overnight rates on the change in loans3 
First Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No of observations: 600 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                    15.6600                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.099)*                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                         0.0501                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.143)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                  0.4350                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.5817                                                   
First Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(3 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No of observations: 630 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates31                                                                    14.9860                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.051)*                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                         0.0453                                                  
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                                                                                                          (0.175)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                  0.4391                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.5728                                                   
First Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(2 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No of observations: 660 
 Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates21                                                                    17.3776                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.012)**                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                        -0.0087                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.799)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                  0.4943                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.4283                                                   
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
3Each specification includes as many lagged values of the dependent variable as the lagged values of the change 
in overnight rates and three seasonal dummy variables. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 
percent level. *** = Significant at 1 percent level. 
Table 7: The effect of the overnight rates on bank loans4 
Log Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 610 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ ON rates41                                                                                        0.0024                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.780)                                                   
Log of Securities                                                                               0.0100                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.793)                                                                                 
Log of Time Deposits                                                                       0.0232                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.250)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.9799                                                  
Log Model with Fixed Effects 
(3 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 639 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ ON rates31                                                                                        0.0036                                                   
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                                                                                                          (0.617)                                                   
Log of Securities                                                                              -0.0037                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.920)                                                                                  
Log of Time Deposits                                                                       0.0095                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.622)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.9799                                                  
Log Model with Fixed Effects 
(2 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 668 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ ON rates21                                                                                        0.0144                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.020)**                                                   
Log of Securities                                                                               0.0229                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.532)                                                                                  
Log of Time Deposits                                                                       0.0174                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.354)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.9838                                                   
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
4Each specification includes as many lagged values of the dependent variable as the lagged values of the change 
in overnight rates, three seasonal dummy variables and five yearly dummy variables. * = Significant at 10 
percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 percent level.       
 
Table 8: The effect of the change in overnight rates on the log change in loans5 
Log Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 579 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                    -0.0003                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.963)                                                   
Log change in Securities                                                                  0.0220                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.620)                                                                                 
Log change in Time Deposits                                                         -0.0038                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.855)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.0726                                                   
Log Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(3 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 608 
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Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates31                                                                    -0.0007                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.903)                                                   
Log change in Securities                                                                 -0.0141                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.751)                                                                                 
Log change in Time Deposits                                                           0.0002                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.991)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.0679                                                   
Log Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(2 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 637 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates21                                                                     -0.0110                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.030)**                                                   
Log change in Securities                                                                   0.0357                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.413)                                                                                 
Log change in Time Deposits                                                           0.0128                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.521)                                                  
R2                                                                                                        0.0391                                                   
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
5Each specification includes as many lagged values of the dependent variable as the lagged values of the change 
in overnight rates and three seasonal dummy variables. * = Significant at 10 percent level.       ** = Significant 
at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 percent level. 
5.2. Results of Panel Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 provide the estimates of the panel data pooled OLS regressions for the three 
models specified. All banks are included in panel data regressions. Sums of the coefficients for four, three and 
two lagged values of the change in overnight rates (except for the log model where overnight rate is used) are 
reported for each model. The aim of adding three and two lagged values of the variable is to see whether the 
results show any improvement when number of observations are increased. The bias caused by using four 
lagged values-which results with a loss of four period’s observations per bank- is resolved in part by decreasing 
the number of the lags for both the growth rate of loans (log of loans for the log model) and the change in 
overnight rates (overnight rates for the log model).  
Table 6 provides the estimates for the first-difference model with four, three and two lagged values in turn. 
Sums of the coefficients of the change in overnight rates are positive and very large for all three cases. 
Moreover, the estimates are significant at 10 percent level for the four and the three lags cases and significant at 
5 percent level for the two lags case. This econometric result suggests that an increase in the overnight rates-
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causing a decrease in the money supply and a contraction in the overall economy-increases the total supply of 
bank loans which contradicts with the existence of a bank lending channel. Estimates for the change in securities 
variable are insignificant in all three cases. Estimates for the change in time deposits are positive and significant 
at 1 percent level in all three cases. During recessions banks’ ability to fund loans by raising time deposits may 
be a plausible explanation for the increase in bank loans however, this implication is not enough to explain the 
underlying reason for the increase in loan supply. 
Table 7 shows the regression results of the log model for three different lag cases. Sum of the coefficients of the 
overnight rates’ lagged values are positive but quite small compared to Table 5. Unlike Table 6, these 
coefficients are not significant except for the two lags case. The coefficient values for the log of securities are 
insignificant. Log of time deposits coefficients are positive but insignificant in all three cases. Since most of the 
results are econometrically insignificant, one may not be able to make plausible explanations based on Table 7. 
Table 8 shows the results of the panel data regression run with the log-difference model. In all three cases, sum 
of the coefficients of lagged values of the change in overnight rates is negative, quite small and insignificant 
except for the two lags case. The negative sign of the coefficients and the 5 percent significance observed at the 
two lags case may provide evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel. However, Table 8 results 
should be interpreted cautiously because the R2 values are quite low which mean that the model is not successful 
in predicting movements of the dependent variable in question. Coefficients of the log change in securities and 
the log change in time deposits variables are insignificant. 
Table 9: The effect of bank asset size on bank loans6 
(Asset dummies added) 
First Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 600 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                      0.1043                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.992)                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                         0.0325                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.353)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                  0.4267                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                  
∑ Asset Slope − Dummies41                                                            90.5981                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.4646                                                   
 Log Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observtions: 630 
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Variable                                                                                                    
∑ ON rates41                                                                                       0.0051                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.558)                                                       
Log of Securities                                                                              0.0703                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.036)**                                                                                 
Log of Time Deposits                                                                     -0.0138                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.380)                                                  
∑ Asset Slope − Dummies41                                                             0.0032                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.598)                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.9798                                                   
Log Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 600 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                    -0.0035                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.979)                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                         0.0497                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.241)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                 0.0137                                                
                                                                                                          (0.041)**                                                  
∑ Asset Slope − Dummies41                                                             0.0023                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.874)                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.0884                                                   
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
6Asset dummies are added to the previously defined first- difference, log and log difference models with four 
lagged cases. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 
percent level. 
 
Table 10: The effect of bank capital on bank loans7 
(capital dummies added) 
First Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 600 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                    36.6112                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.006)***                                                   
Change in Securities                                                                        0.0466                                                  
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                                                                                                          (0.173)                                                                                 
Change in Time Deposits                                                                 0.4326                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.000)***                                                  
∑ Capital Slope − Dummies41                                                       -39.4620                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.022)**                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.5628                                                   
Log Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 610 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                      0.0044                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.618)                                                   
Log Securities                                                                                   0.0091                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.810)                                                                                 
Log Time Deposits                                                                           0.0264                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.191)                                                  
∑ Capital Slope − Dummies41                                                          -0.0046                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.384)                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.9803                                                   
Log Difference Model with Fixed Effects 
(4 lags of the change in overnight rates used) 
No. of observations: 579 
Variable                                                                                                    
∑ Change in ON rates41                                                                      0.0026                                                   
                                                                                                          (0.770)                                                   
Log change in Securities                                                                   0.0192                                                  
                                                                                                          (0.667)                                                                                 
Log change in Time Deposits                                                          -0.0030                                                 
                                                                                                          (0.885)                                                  
∑ Capital Slope − Dummies41                                                          -0.0062                                                    
                                                                                                          (0.623)                                                   
R2                                                                                                        0.0764                                                   
NOTES: P-values in paranthesis 
 
7Capital dummies are added to the previously defined first- difference, log and log difference models with four 
lagged cases. * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = Significant at 1 
percent level. 
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Table 9 presents the estimation results for the first-difference, the log and the log-difference models with four 
lagged values of the change in overnight rates used, adding an interactive dummy measuring the effect of bank 
asset size on loans. The coefficient is formed by summing the coefficients of four slope-dummy variables 
representing the large banks. Slope-dummies are equal to the corresponding lag of the change in overnight rates 
variable if the bank is in the large bank category, and they are equal to zero otherwise. The sum of four asset 
slope-dummy coefficients is positive in all three models, and interestingly it is quite large and significant at 1 
percent level in the first-difference model’s case where it is small and insignificant in the other two models’ 
cases. When we sum up the coefficient associated with the overnight rates and the coefficient associated with 
the asset-size dummy, we see that it is quite large in the first-difference model but quite small in the two other 
models. The coefficient of the asset-size dummy in the first model suggests that larger banks are more 
responsive to changes in overnight rates however the same coefficients in the other two models do not support 
this finding. 
In Table 10, instead of the asset slope-dummies, the capital slope-dummies are added to the regressions run with 
the above mentioned three models. The coefficient is formed in the same way with the asset-size coefficient, 
where capital slope-dummies are equal to the corresponding lag of the change in overnight rates variable if the 
bank is in the well-capitalized category, and zero otherwise. The coefficient for the capital dummy is negative in 
all three models furthermore it is quite large (in absolute value) and significant at 5 percent level in the first-
difference model’s case. The sum of the overnight rate coefficient and the capital dummy coefficient is close to 
zero in the first difference model, which suggests that the sensitivity of the well-capitalized banks to the 
overnight rates is low but when we look at the overnight rate coefficient only (not the sum), it suggests that the 
sensitivity increases for undercapitalized banks. 
   Panel data results show some evidence of the bank lending channel. However, the evidence is not robust under 
alternative specifications. This may be due to the small data set used which is a common problem for 
researchers who do empirical work in Turkish data. 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the effects of changes in the Turkish Central Bank overnight rates on bank loan supplies. 
Banks are divided by their asset-size and equity capital to assets ratio to search for a bank lending channel. This 
study hypothesizes that small, under-capitalized banks should be more responsive to changes in overnight rates 
than large, well-capitalized banks consistent with the bank lending channel view. To test the hypothesis, I first 
use the approach taken by Kishan and Opiela [2] and then I introduce panel data pooled OLS estimation 
technique with three fixed effects models over the 2002Q4-2008Q4 period.  
Results provide significant evidence that small banks may not be able to raise time deposits as easily as large 
banks during contractionary periods. This finding is supportive for the bank lending channel. In addition, panel 
data results on the effect of capital on bank loan behavior provide some evidence that the undercapitalized banks 
are more sensitive to changes in overnight rates which further supports the existence of bank lending channel. 
However the panel data results including the effect of asset size on bank loan behavior does not support our 
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hypothesis, and the coefficients associated with the change in overnight rates in both the OLS and the panel 
OLS approaches are insignificant which does not support the existence of a BLC. This result may be due to the 
small data set available in Turkey.  
Even though the results are not very strong, I find some evidence that bank capital may be important for the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey. For building a strong banking system, bank capital seems to play 
an important role. Increasing capital requirements may help creating sounder bank intermediation, and also 
suggested by the results of this study, this may lead to a banking system which is less fragile to the changes in 
the monetary policy. 
7. Data Appendix 
Data is quarterly and it starts from the fourth quarter of 2002 and ends with the fourth quarter of 2008. As of 
June30, 2009; there are 45 banks operating in Turkey. 32 of them are deposit banks. Within deposit banks, 3 
banks are state-owned, 11 banks are privately-owned and 17 banks are foreign banks. There is one bank 
operating under the control of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Out of 32 deposit banks, 2 banks are eliminated 
because these banks did not report loans for more than half of the estimation period. Because growth rates of 
and the changes in the bank balance sheet items are used in regressions, first observations are dropped for each 
bank. In addition, using 4 lagged values of the change in the overnight rates drops 4 observations for each bank 
(using 3 and 2 lagged values drops 3 and 2 observations in the same way). So, with a total of 30 banks and 20 
periods, 600 bank-quarters of observations are used except the log model where directly the logged values of the 
variables are taken and without dropping the first observations for 30 banks and using 21 periods of 
observations per bank, 630 bank-quarters are used. 
Quarterly detailed balance sheets of the banks are obtained from the Turkish Banking Association and the equity 
capital to assets ratios are constructed by using these balance sheets. The data for loans, securities, demand 
deposits and time deposits for each bank over the period 2002Q4-2008Q4 are also provided by these quarterly 
balance sheets. The data source for the GDP series and the consumption expenditures series is the Turkish 
Central Bank. The quarterly overnight rates are also supplied by the Turkish Central Bank. The following web-
sites are utilized: 
Turkish Banking Association,  http://www.tbb.org.tr 
Central Bank of Turkey, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr 
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